Книга: A System of Moral Science

Purchase of this book includes free trial access to million-books where you can read more than a million books for free. This is an OCR edition with typos. Excerpt from book: CHAPTER II. THE ULTIMATE RULE OP EIGHT. We do not apprehend pure truth, except we have some ground in which the truth is, inasmuch as truth always particularizes, and can give no criterion of itself in general. This is the same in moral truth, as in mathematical and philosophical and hence the necessity of finding some ground in which the truth of the' ultimate Rule of right shall be made immediately manifest. This can be done only by a clear apprehension of The Highest GOOD, since that must be the ground in which the ultimate Rule shall reveal itself. Summum bonum est suprema lex but the summum bonum is easily, and often very much, misapprehended. It is quite essential that we mark a distinction in kind, and not merely in degree, otherwise it will be impossible to put any system of morals upon a necessary and universal basis. We shall else have a rule as a deduction from what is, not a rule determining universally what ought to be. The highest good is intrinsically peculiar. It does not stand in any determination of degrees, but distinguishes itself as wholly a different thing. It is quite necessary to a foundation of moral science, that such complete distinction be made apparent, and though it necessitatea protracted and patient analysis, there is still no alternative if we would bring our moral system within the conditions of a true science. It may, then, be remarked in general, that no sensible appearance nor mental conception can be scarcely ever given to the mind as a mere dry intellectual object. Its presence in the consciousness will awaken some susceptibility to feeling, and induce more or less emotion. All these feelings will range themselves under two distinct classes. 1. There are feelings which can not rest in the mere contemplation of the objects whi...